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This paper investigates the relation between bank capital and pro￿tability. To
my knowledge, no previous paper has analysed this problem in a two-equation struc-
tural model. Contrary to what is reported with surprising frequency in this ￿eld
of research, the results show no statistically signi￿cant relationship between capital
and pro￿tability. Given non-binding capital requirements this ￿nding is consistent
with the view that, while raising capital is costly for banks, it is associated with
compensating bene￿ts that o⁄set these additional costs. Consequently, when cap-
ital structure is endogenously determined in a pro￿t maximising equilibrium, no
systematic relation between capital and pro￿t is expected.
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11 Introduction
Over the past three decades deregulation, and more recently, reregulation have changed
the landscape on which ￿nancial intermediaries operate and compete. At the forefront of
the regulatory debate has been the issue of capital adequacy for banks, which ultimately
saw the establishment of a landmark international regulatory agreement known as the
Basel Capital Accord in 1988. Accordingly, it is important to understand what role, if
any, bank capital plays in determining bank performance.
This paper takes a closer look at the relationship between pro￿tability - as our
measure of performance - and bank capital. Most of the early research (for example
Short, 1979; Bourke, 1988; and Molyneux and Thornton 1993) on the determinants of
bank pro￿tability focuses on the relationship between earnings and concentration. This
line of work ￿t into the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm which generally
tries to explain the signi￿cant positive empirical relationship between bank earnings and
industry concentration.
These studies, along with the more recent literature such as Dermirguc-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999, 2000), Goddard et al. (2004a), Athanasoglou et al. (2005) and Davis
and Zhu (2005) employ a linear single equation framework to estimate the impact of
various factors on banking pro￿tability. Two exceptions are papers by Berger (1995b)
and Goddard et al. (2004b).
Goddard et al. (2004b) use a two equation reduced form vector autoregression (VAR)
model construction to look at the relationship between growth - measured by the change
in logarithmic size (total assets) of a given bank over a one year period - and return-on-
equity (ROE). They ￿nd that there are few systematic in￿ uences on bank growth except
for a negative relationship between the capital-to-asset ratio (CAR) and bank growth.
They also ￿nd evidence supporting the view that bank pro￿ts are persistent and that
banks with a higher CAR tend to record lower pro￿tability. Berger (1995b) investigates
the relationship between capital and earnings in a simple two equation reduced form
framework where he regresses the CAR and ROE on three years of lagged CAR and
ROE along with a number of control variables. His main ￿nding is causation - via tests
of Granger causality - runs in both directions between capital and earnings. Berger￿ s
(1995b) important contribution to the debate was to identify potential explanations for
the positive relationship between capital and pro￿t that, with few exceptions, have been
found in the literature to date. He argues that this ￿nding could be the result of either
a reduction in insurance and/or borrowing costs when holding more capital or the result
of a signalling equilibrium where it is easier for managers of less risky banks to signal
2quality by maintaining high levels of capital than managers of riskier banks. This
empirical ￿nding is in contrast to the orthodox theoretical conclusion which suggests the
impact of raising capital on bank pro￿ts to be negative. Despite the fact that his paper
alludes to the possibility that there may be a structural relationship between capital and
earnings, little has been done in the recent literature to account for this and estimate
an appropriate econometric model.
The results of testing reveal unequivocal evidence for endogeneity of CAR. With
this is mind, the current paper employs a two equation structural model, where capital
is modelled endogenously, to estimate the impacts of various factors on bank earnings.
The paper reports no systematic relationship between CAR and pro￿tability which is in
stark contrast to the positive and signi￿cant relationship that is reported in the extant
literature.
There is no doubt that raising capital comes at some cost. Herein lies the eternal
struggle between regulators and the banks on the issue of capital and its adequacy. The
central concern however, is whether increasing capital provides compensating bene￿ts
to the bank in the way that Berger (1995b) articulates.1 If so, there should be no
systematic relation between capital and earnings. Indeed, if the advantages are not
fully compensating then we would expect a systematic relation. But this raises a
natural question, if bene￿ts are not fully compensating, then why do we observe banks
holding capital well above what is o¢ cially required? It is therefore argued that, so
long as capital requirements are not binding, a bank￿ s capital ratio emerges endogenously
within the pro￿t maximisation equilibrium. Thus no systematic relation between capital
and pro￿t is expected.
None of this discussion is suggesting that previous research does not provide us with
meaningful analyses of the determinants of banking performance. Nevertheless, the
econometric techniques employed in previous studies that neglect potential endogeneity
problems and either completely ignore or do not account adequately for some features
of banking pro￿tability (such as persistence) could result in misleading conclusions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The determinants of bank pro￿tability
included in the analysis are discussed in the following section, of particular interest is the
role of capital in determining pro￿tability. Section three outlines the data and variables
used. Section four outlines the econometric approach employed. Section ￿ve presents
and discusses the results. Concluding remarks are presented in section six.
1In addition to the bene￿ts outlined by Berger (1995b), Ngo (2006) presents a model of bank opti-
mising behaviour in the presence of capital requirements and suggests that banks will issue capital so
long as the bene￿ts of a reduction in the expected costs associated with breaching regulatory guidelines
is greater than the excess cost of equity ￿nancing.
32 The Determinants of Bank Performance
There is an extensive empirical literature on bank performance, so I do not attempt to
cover it in full here. Rather, the focus is on the results of the more prominent studies
that use pro￿tability and earnings as a measure of performance. These studies vary
signi￿cantly in their approach and subsequent ￿ndings. Some authors (for example
Short, 1979; Bourke, 1988; and Molyneux and Thornton, 1993; Dermirguc-Kunt and
Huizinga, 1999 & 2000; Bikker and Hu, 2002; Davis and Zhu, 2005) examine and compare
the determinants of pro￿tability across di⁄erent countries, while others (for example
Berger 1995a & 1995b; Goddard et al., 2004a & 2004b; Athanasoglou et al., 2005) focus
on individual countries￿banking sectors. Nevertheless, a review of the existing literature
reveals the following list as the usual determinants of bank pro￿tability.
Lagged Pro￿tability: The persistence of pro￿t (POP) literature concerns itself
with testing the hypothesis that markets are su¢ ciently competitive such that any ab-
normal pro￿ts are eroded quickly, and that all ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts tend to some long term
average. The alternative to this is that ￿rms poses some kind of market power or com-
parative advantage enabling them to achieve abnormal pro￿ts persistently over time.
There are few empirical tests of the POP hypothesis in the banking literature, however,
one recent example by Berger et al. (2000) presents evidence of POP in U.S. banking.
They show that pro￿t converges more slowly to its long-run average value in banking
than in manufacturing and that market power plays a crucial role in allowing abnormal
pro￿ts to persist.
Capital: The debate surrounding capital and its ￿ adequacy￿is an important concern
for both banks as well as the regulators thus has been at the forefront of policy discussions
for decades. Despite the immense amount of work that has been devoted to the issue,
there has been little in the way of agreement among the various commentators as to
the guiding principles (Pringle, 1975). First, the e⁄ectiveness of capital in curbing
excessive risk taking by banks and reducing the probability of bankruptcy is contested.
The orthodox argument (Berger, Herring and Szego, 1995; Kaufman, 1991; Furlong and
Keeley, 1989; Keeley and Furlong, 1990) is that capital acts as a bu⁄er against failure,
thus regulations that force banks to hold more capital will reduce the likelihood of
bankruptcy. Other authors however disagree and suggest that capital regulations may
indeed lead to increased risk taking by banks (Kahane, 1977; Koehn and Santomero,1980;
Lam and Chen, 1985). Second, whether capital regulations have any impact on a bank￿ s
actual capital decision is also a moot point. Previous empirical work on the e⁄ectiveness
of bank capital regulation in determining actual capital levels have contrasting results.
4Peltzman (1970) and Dietrich and James (1983) ￿nd no regulatory e⁄ect on bank capital
whereas Mingo (1975) ￿nds that capital adequacy regulation had a signi￿cant impact
on bank capital.
The ￿nal area of contention - which this paper is predominantly interested in - is
the impact of capital on bank performance or pro￿tability. According to conventional
wisdom a bank￿ s riskiness is determined by its ability to absorb unforeseen losses. Given
that capital is viewed to act as a bu⁄er against losses, a high CAR tends to be associated
with lower pro￿tability. That is, capital tends to lower the risk on equity and thus lowers
the equilibrium expected ROE (Berger, 1995b).2 This hypothesised lower risk lower
return relationship based on standard Markowitzian reasoning seems quite plausible,
nevertheless, previous empirical studies on the impact of capital on pro￿tability have
provided con￿ icting results. Some authors (for example Bourke, 1989; Molyneux and
Thornton, 1992; Berger, 1995b; Goddard et. al., 2004a) ￿nd a positive relationship
between capital and pro￿tability, whereas others (for example Goddard et. al., 2004b)
provide evidence in favour of the hypothesised relationship. Berger (1995b) is the
only paper that looks closely at the relationship between capital and earnings. In
Granger-causality tests, he ￿nds that positive causation runs both ways between CAR
and ROE. The positive causation from ROE to CAR is not particularly surprising,
given the hypothesis that banks retain part of their marginal earnings in the form of
increases in capital (Berger, 1995b). The positive relationship that runs from CAR to
ROE is more surprising, and is the result that is most relevant to the capital adequacy
debate. Although not the ￿rst to report a positive relationship between CAR and ROE,
Berger (1995b) was the ￿rst to propose some plausible theoretical explanations for this
￿nding. Outside of the Markowitzian single period world with perfect capital markets,
Berger (1995b) comes up with two seemingly possible reasons for a positive relationship
between CAR and ROE. First, a bank that is maintaining a low CAR - relative to the
equilibrium value - may have relatively high expected bankruptcy costs, thus an increase
in the CAR may lead to an increase in the ROE by lowering insurance costs on uninsured
debt. Second, Berger (1995b) suggests that this positive relationship could be the result
of a signalling equilibrium. That is, bank managers may have private information about
the bank￿ s future pro￿tability and/or a stake in the value of the bank through incentive
2Even if we do not believe the CAR is a good proxy for how risky a bank is, there are other arguments
as to why raising capital may lead to reduced pro￿ts. First, debt is usually a cheaper form of ￿nancing
thus forcing banks away from their optimal capital ratio should result in a reduction in pro￿tability -
although this is only a problem if capital requirements are binding. Second, from a bank￿ s perspective
holding idle capital is an expensive safeguard against risk because the bank￿ s shareholders demand a
return on their investment and idle capital provides no such return.
5payments and it may be less expensive for managers of low risk banks to signal quality
by maintaining a high CAR than for managers of high risk banks. Related to this, other
authors (for example, Bernauer and Koubi, 2002) suggest that competitive forces may
motivate banks to maintain higher capital ratios as a means of lowering their borrowing
costs.
All this suggests that CAR may be endogenous, and although almost all the work
that has followed Berger (1995b) have discussed his results, none have attempted to
estimate a structural relationship. It is worth noting here that virtually all the the-
oretical literature analysing banking behaviour has assumed that capital requirements
are a binding constraint on banking behaviour and therefore not treated capital as a
managerial decision. Nevertheless, Baltensperger (1980) presents a model where banks
choose a level of capital that weighs up the bene￿ts of reduced insolvency costs against
the costs of holding more capital which is assumed to be greater than the cost of debt
- potential bankruptcy provides banks with an incentive to hold a positive amount of
capital. Pringle (1974) has also discussed the bank￿ s capital decision but in a model that
ignores bankruptcy costs, which is stressed in Baltensperger￿ s (1980) analysis. These
two models however ignore any potential in￿ uence that formal capital requirements may
have on the banks optimal choice of capital ratio. On this point Ngo (2006) presents a
model of bank optimising behaviour in the presence of capital requirements. He shows
that banks will tend to hold capital in excess of the o¢ cial requirements in order to
avoid the expected costs associated with regulatory breach and suggests that this might
be an explanation for the observed over-compliance with capital regulations and there-
fore existence of non-binding capital requirements. Here the capital ratio is de￿ned in
accordance with the Basel Accord guidelines, CAR is the ratio of total capital (Tier 1
capital plus Tier 2 capital) to total risk weighted assets.3
3Tier 1 (core) capital for banks consists of: (1) common stockholders￿equity capital; (2) noncumu-
lative perpetual preferred stock and any related surplus; and (3) minority interests in equity capital
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries, less goodwill, other disallowed intangible assets, and disallowed
deferred tax assets, and any other amounts that are deducted in determining Tier 1 capital in accordance
with the capital standards issued by the reporting bank￿ s primary federal supervisory authority. Tier 2
(supplementary) capital is limited to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital and consists of: (1) cumulative perpet-
ual preferred stock and any related surplus; (2) long-term preferred stock (original maturity of 20 years
or more) and any related surplus (discounted for capital purposes as it approaches maturity); (3) auction
rate and similar preferred stock (both cumulative and noncumulative); (4) hybrid capital instruments
(including mandatory convertible debt securities); (5) term subordinated debt and intermediate-term
preferred stock (original weighted average maturity of ￿ve years or more) to the extent of 50 percent of
Tier 1 capital (and discounted for capital purposes as they approach maturity); and (6) the allowance
for loan and lease losses (limited to the lesser of the balance of the allowance account or 1.25 percent
of gross risk-weighted assets). When determining the amount of risk-weighted assets, on-balance sheet
assets are assigned an appropriate risk weight (zero percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, or 100 percent) and
6Size: Size is introduced to account for any (dis)economies of scale in the market.
Akhavein et al. (1997) and Smirlock (1985) amongst others ￿nd a positive and signif-
icant relationship between size and pro￿tability, however, other researchers (Berger et
al., 1987; Boyd and Grahame, 1991) indicate that economies of scale in banking tend
to be exhausted at relatively low sizes, which suggests that large banks could eventu-
ally face scale ine¢ ciencies. The relationship between size, capital and pro￿tability
is a particularly interesting one, which to date has not yet been su¢ ciently explored.
Athanasoglou et al. (2005) suggest that size is closely related to capital in that large
banks are able to raise capital relatively cheaply consequently making them appear more
pro￿table. Moreover, large banks may posses market power through stronger brand im-
age or implicit ￿ too-big-to-fail￿regulatory protection. Another mechanism suggesting a
(negative) causality from size to pro￿tability (see Goddard et. al., 2004b) can be found
in the ￿ managerial ￿rm￿and agency costs literature. If managers of large ￿rms have
discretionary powers and pursue other objectives - such as, salaries, non-pecuniary ben-
e￿ts, power or prestige - size (or growth) may well enter the ￿rm￿ s objective function
as well as pro￿tability. Of course, growth in demand is constrained by the size of the
market, thus there are limits to the size that a ￿rm can grow before adversely a⁄ecting
pro￿tability. On the other hand, many authors have pointed out (for example Berger,
1995b; Goddard et. al., 2004b) that a principal source of capital is retained earnings.
Consequently, under the current regulatory regime where banks are required to meet
certain capital adequacy requirements, pro￿t is an important determinant for the ex-
pansion of a bank￿ s portfolio of risky assets. The natural logarithm of total assets is
included as a proxy for size, while the square of the natural logarithm of total assets is
included to capture any nonlinearities in the size-pro￿t relationship.
Diversi￿cation: International competition in banking started increasing in the
1970s and intensi￿ed through the 1980s and 1990s which resulted in falling fees and
margins. In an attempt to maintain market share, many banks responded by ex-
panding their product portfolio, merger and expansion into overseas markets. Product
diversi￿cation was particularly important as it allowed banks to spread risks across dif-
ferent assets and was predominantly achieved via conducting a signi￿cant proportion of
o⁄-balance sheet items are ￿rst converted to a credit equivalent amount and then assigned to one of the
four risk weight categories. The on-balance sheet assets and the credit equivalent amounts of o⁄-balance
sheet items are then multiplied by the appropriate risk weight percentages and the sum of these risk-
weighted amounts, less certain deductions, is the bank￿ s gross risk-weighted assets. These deductions are
for goodwill, other disallowed intangible assets, disallowed deferred tax assets, investments in banking
and ￿nance subsidiaries that are not consolidated for regulatory capital purposes, intentional reciprocal
cross-holdings of banking organizations￿capital instruments, and other deductions as determined by the
reporting bank￿ s primary federal supervisory authority.
7their business ￿ o⁄-balance-sheet￿(OBS) - including loan commitments, letters of credit
and derivatives. Demsetz and Strahan (1997) examine the role of diversi￿cation in US
banking and ￿nd that the risk-reducing potential of diversi￿cation at large bank holding
companies (BHCs) is o⁄set by their lower capital ratios and larger commercial and in-
dustrial loan portfolios. The few other studies which included the size of a bank￿ s OBS
portfolio as a determinant of pro￿tability have reported mixed results (see Goddard et
al., 2004a). Diversi￿cation is proxied in this study by including the ratio of nominal
OBS business to the sum of total assets and nominal OBS business.
Credit Risk: Asset quality is also a determinant of pro￿tability. Poor asset
quality resulting in non-performing loans is a key element in bank failures. One would
therefore anticipate that pro￿tability is negatively associated with credit risk, ceteris
paribus. While capital acts as a bu⁄er against unforeseen losses, a bank presumably
knows the credit risk of its portfolio and thus will provision for the likelihood of default.
For this reason, the ratio of loan-loss provisions to loans is used as a proxy for credit
risk. Banks can therefore improve pro￿tability by improving screening, monitoring and
forecasting of credit risk facilities. The empirical literature has tended to ￿nd a negative
relationship between credit risk and earnings (Athanasoglou et al., 2005).
Operating Expenses: The cost component of a standard pro￿t function is im-
portant and should be captured in any analysis of pro￿tability. Bourke (1989) and
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) amongst others include sta⁄ expenses as a proxy for
general overhead expenses. We would expect a priori that higher costs, all things
equal, to be associated with lower pro￿tability. It is interesting to note then that both
Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) report a counter intuitive ￿nding of
a positive coe¢ cient on their sta⁄ expenses variable. Molyneux and Thornton (1992)
suggest that this ￿nding could result from pro￿ts earned by ￿rms in a regulated industry
being appropriated in the form of payroll expenditures. Athanasoglou et al. (2005) sug-
gest that higher sta⁄ expenses could be due to the hiring of higher quality management
which ultimately leads to higher pro￿ts. We include the ratio of operating expenses to
total assets to account for impact of costs on pro￿tability.
Concentration: As mentioned previously, most of the early research in this area
focused on the impact of industry concentration on pro￿tability. The literature was
principally concerned with explaining the common empirical ￿nding of a positive rela-
tionship between concentration and pro￿tability. Two opposing, nevertheless mutually
acceptable explanations for this positive relationship have been advanced - the monopoly
power (MP) or structure-conduct-performance (SCP) and the e¢ cient structure (ES).4
4See Berger (1995a) for a comprehensive discussion and application to the U.S. banking industry.
8Although there are slight variants on the MP and ES hypotheses, broadly, the MP asserts
that the positive ￿nding re￿ ects the setting of less favourable prices to consumers (lower
deposit rates, higher loan rates) in more concentrated markets as a result of market
power. In contrast, the ES hypothesis - whether it is an X-e¢ ciency or scale economies
argument - advocates that larger ￿rms can achieve cost savings and thus higher pro￿ts.
The focus of this paper is not on trying to explain which of these hypotheses best ex-
plains the positive pro￿t-structure relationship, rather, concentration is simply included
as a control variable for completeness. Previous studies have employed a number of
di⁄erent measures including concentration ratios and various indices, here concentration
is measured using the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).5
Macroeconomy: The impact of demand side factors and the macroeconomic en-
vironment have always been recognised as potentially in￿ uencing bank performance.
The variables that have been used in the past include gross domestic product (GDP),
some measure of growth in the banking market, in￿ ation and/or interest rate. GDP
per capita and market growth - as typically measured by the annual growth in money
supply (Bourke, 1989), growth in total deposits (Berger, 1995b) or growth in total as-
sets - are generally included to account for changes in demand. An expanding market,
particularly those associated with entry barriers, should be accompanied with increased
pro￿ts. Revell (1979) - cf. Bourke (1989) - was the ￿rst to suggest that in￿ ation may
be an important determinant in explaining variations in bank pro￿tability. Whether
in￿ ation a⁄ects pro￿tability depends on whether wages and other non-interest cost are
growing faster than the rate of in￿ ation. Of course, if banks are sophisticated enough
and are able to forecast and manage their costs accordingly then one may expect a posi-
tive relationship between in￿ ation and earnings. That is, if in￿ ation is fully anticipated
and banks can appropriately adjust interest rates so as to increase their revenues faster
than operating costs, it would be possible that higher in￿ ation leads to greater prof-
its. Most studies (including Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992)) ￿nd
a positive association between in￿ ation and earnings. Accordingly, the growth in the
consumer price index (CPI) as well as growth in real GDP are also included to the list
of regressors.
3 Data and Other Variables
The data are collected from the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), Bank Reg-
ulatory Database. This database contains ￿ve sub-databases for regulated depository
5See Rhoades (1982) for a review of concentration ratios and the HHI.
9￿nancial institutions which provide accounting data for bank holding companies, com-
mercial banks, savings banks, and savings and loans institutions. The source of the
data comes from the required regulatory forms ￿lled for supervisory purposes. This
study focuses on commercial banks. The Commercial Bank Database, from the Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago (FRB Chicago), contains data of all banks ￿ling the Report
of Condition and Income (named ￿Call Report￿ ) that are regulated by the Federal Re-
serve System (the Fed), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the O¢ ce
of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). These reports include balance sheet, income
statements, risk-based capital measures and o⁄-balance-sheet data. The Commercial
Bank Database has data available quarterly from March 1976 to March 2005 and in-
cludes basically all commercial banks and savings banks. It does not have data from
savings institutions (e.g. S&L associations) that ￿le the Thrift Financial Report (TFR)
with the O¢ ce of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Over the years, although there have been
37,962 banks in total that have ￿lled out at least one Call Report, with failures, start-
ups and mergers the number of commercial banks at any given point in time has varied
signi￿cantly - averaging about 12,000 at a given time. For the purposes of this study,
we sample the 2500 largest banks according to total assets in the March quarter of 1996
and track them through till March 2005 yielding a very large data set of over 62,000
bank observations.
The dependent variable of primary interest is bank earnings. The most common
measures employed are net income to equity or return on equity (ROE) and net income
to total assets or return on assets (ROA). Most studies typically use only one of the
measures, but we will perform the analysis using both. Sundararajan et al. (2002)
highlight the need to simultaneously look at several operating ratios when analysing
bank performance due to variations in business practices across banks and time. For
example, banks with lower leverage (higher equity) will tend to have a higher ROA
but lower ROE. The problem is that banks can in￿ ate their ROE by operating with
extremely low levels of equity capital, often supported by implicit government guarantees
(Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999). An analysis of ROE disregards the greater
risks normally associated with greater debt ￿nancing, thus ROA emerges as a preferred
measure of pro￿tability - ideally, one would use a risk adjusted ROE but this is not
available.
Year dummies are included to account for any time e⁄ects not captured by the
macroeconomic and industry control variables, with the base year being 1976. We also
include dummies indicating the state in which a bank is located to control for bank
location, regulatory environment ￿for example, di⁄ering state chartering and branching
10laws - and any other state speci￿c variation that have not been captured by the other
variables, with the base being New York. Finally, a dummy variable indicating a bank￿ s
charter authority - either federal or state - is included to account for any di⁄erences
between federal and various state chartering laws.
4 Econometric Model
Unlike previous research in this area, the present study proposes a two equation struc-
tural model. Of particular interest is the coe¢ cient on CAR in equation (1), ￿2. As
discussed previously, although a few studies have found a negative coe¢ cient, the ma-
jority of have found this coe¢ cient to be signi￿cant and positive.
￿it = ￿1i + ￿2CARit + ￿3￿it￿1 + ￿4SIZEit + ￿5SSIZEit + ￿6OEit
+￿7CRit + ￿8DIVit + ￿9GDPt + ￿10CPIt + ￿11HHIt + ￿ ￿
12Xit + eit (1)
and
CARit = ￿1i + ￿2￿it + ￿3CARit￿1 + ￿4STOCKt + ￿5SIZEit + ￿6SSIZEit
+￿7CRit + ￿8DIVit + ￿9GDPt + ￿10CPIt + ￿ ￿
11Xit + uit (2)
Where ￿it is either the ROE or ROA and Xit is a vector of time, state and charter
dummy variables. Lagged CAR and STOCK are used to identify the capital ratio equa-
tion. The rationale for using lagged CAR as an instrument is obvious - we hypothesise
that lagged values of CAR are highly correlated with current CAR but not correlated
with the error term in equation 1. The variable STOCK is the Dow Jones Wilshire
5000 Index (in levels). The state of the stock market is hypothesised to be related to
CAR for two reasons. First, there is extensive literature suggesting that issuing new
equity is costly, and that these costs associated with new equity issuance will increase
when the stock market is weaker which suggests a positive correlation between CAR
and STOCK. Alternatively, it is possible that a negative relationship between CAR and
STOCK exists because under current Basel Accord guidelines, banks are only allowed to
count up to 50 percent of hidden reserves - unrealised capital gains on holdings of stock
- as Tier 2 capital, thus in a bullish market banks may actually reduce their holdings of
o¢ cial capital due to the increased bu⁄er they receive from increases in hidden reserves
11that do not go into o¢ cial CAR calculations. Table 1 reports all the variables and their
de￿nitions used in this study while Table 2 provides summary statistics.6
Although the time dimension of this study is not overly large, we preempt any con-
cerns that the proceeding results may be spurious on the grounds of non-stationarity of
the panel. For an unbalance panel Maddala and Wu (1999) suggest using the Fisher
test, which is based on the p-values of N independent unit root tests. Fisher￿ s test as-
sumes that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alternative
that at least one series in the panel is stationary. We test for a unit root in ROA, ROE
and CAR. The results of the tests reject the null of a unit root at the one percent level
of signi￿cance for all the variables.7
At this point we perform tests of endogeneity to con￿rm our hypothesis that capital
is in fact endogenous to the pro￿t equation and should be modelled as such. Table 3
presents the results of endogeneity tests for the pooled and ￿xed-e⁄ects least squares
regressions. Two variants of the standard Hausman test are used to test for endogene-
ity in the pooled regression, while the Davidson-MacKinnon test is used for the panel
regressions. The results for all regressions indicate a rejection of the null hypothe-
sis of exogeneity in favour of the alternative (endogeneity) at the one percent level of
signi￿cance. Similar results are found for the CAR regressions which is to be expected.
Both equations are estimated using pooled instrumental variables (IV)/two-stage
least squares (2SLS), ￿xed-e⁄ects IV/2SLS, general methods of moments (GMM) IV as
well as dynamic panel methods (di⁄erenced GMM).8 Standard practice when estimating
a system of equations is to use pooled or ￿xed-e⁄ects 2SLS, however this approach is not
ideal in the presence of heteroscedasticity. In this situation, the standard least squares
IV estimates of the standard errors are inconsistent, preventing valid inference. One way
around this problem is to employ Hansen￿ s (1982) general method of moments to estimate
the system which will produce heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
standard errors. The advantages of GMM over least squares is clear, in the presence of
heteroscedasticity, the GMM estimator is more e¢ cient than the simple IV estimator,
6All tables are contained at the end of the of the paper.
7We do not present the results in a formal table in the paper. The Fisher test uses either the
augmented Dickey-Fuller test or the Phillips-Perron test for the N independent unit root tests. Both
the Dickey-Fuller and Phiilips-Perron tests are employed here with no discernible di⁄erence in the results.
8The appropriate panel model is chosen on the grounds of diagnostic testing, the results of which
are not formally presented. First, for both equations, we reject the null that all ￿xed e⁄ects are zero
at the one percent level of signi￿cance thus we favour a panel data model over pooled 2SLS/IV. Next,
in the Hausman speci￿cation test for both equations, the null that the di⁄erence between the estimates
of the ￿xed-e⁄ects and random-e⁄ects models is not systematic is rejected at the one percent level of
signi￿cance. Consequently, we prefer the ￿xed-e⁄ects 2SLS/IV model over the random-e⁄ects 2SLS/IV
model.
12whereas if heteroscedasticity is not present, the GMM estimator is asymptotically no
worse than the standard IV.9
In equations (1) and (2), ￿1i and ￿1i are individual (bank) e⁄ects. When the time
dimension is small, allowing for both individual e⁄ects and lagged dependent variables
implies that pooled and ￿xed-e⁄ects least squares estimates may be biased and incon-
sistent. Although developed in several stages, the general approach to circumventing
this problem relies on a GMM estimator - normally known as the Di⁄erenced GMM
estimator - developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995). In
either the ￿xed-e⁄ect or random-e⁄ects models, this heterogeneity can be swept away
by taking ￿rst di⁄erences, thus eliminating a potential source of omitted variable bias
in estimation. However, in ￿rst di⁄erences, predetermined variables - that is, the
lagged dependent variables - become endogenous. Therefore, predetermined variables
and endogenous variables in ￿rst di⁄erences are instrumented with suitable lags of their
own levels - here we use second order lags. Strictly exogenous variables, as well as any
other instruments enter the instrument matrix in the conventional instrumental variables
fashion - in ￿rst di⁄erences.
5 Results and Discussion
As mentioned earlier both equations are estimated using four di⁄erent techniques, once
with ROE as the proxy for pro￿tability and then repeated using ROA as the proxy for
pro￿tability yielding eight sets of results for each equation which we now discuss in turn.
5.1 Pro￿tability Regressions
Tables 4A and 4B present the results from the estimation of equation (1). There was
little di⁄erence between the results whether ROE or ROA was used as the measure of
pro￿tability.
With the exception of the ￿xed-e⁄ects regression using ROE as the dependent vari-
able, the coe¢ cient on CAR in both the pooled and ￿xed-e⁄ects 2SLS/IV (Table 4A) is
positive and signi￿cant. This conforms with the ￿ndings in almost all previous research
looking at the determinants of banking performance that have included some measure
of capital as a possible determinant. Orthodox reasoning suggests however that holding
9However, Hayashi (2000) points out that the GMM estimator may have poor small sample properties
since obtaining reasonable estimates of fourth moments to form the optimal weighting matrix requires
relatively large sample sizes. In this paper, we have a su¢ ciently large data set for this not to be a
problem.
13more capital should reduce pro￿tability. Recall that Berger (1995b) suggested that
this positive relationship could be the result of either a reduction in insurance and/or
borrowing costs for banks with higher levels of capital or the result of some kind of
signalling equilibrium where it is easier for managers of less risky banks to signal quality
by maintaining high levels of capital than managers of riskier banks. This reasoning
seems plausible and has been widely accepted in the literature that followed Berger￿ s
(1995b) contribution.
Nevertheless, when GMM is used to estimate the system we ￿nd no statistically sig-
ni￿cant relationship between CAR and pro￿tability in either levels or ￿rst di⁄erences
(Table 4B). It therefore appears that the ￿nding of a systematic relationship between
capital and pro￿t is not robust to more rigorous estimation techniques. This ￿nding
is in stark contrast with the existing literature, but is consistent with the view that
while holding more capital is costly according to orthodoxy, it also yields compensating
advantages - as suggested by Berger (1995b) - that generally o⁄set the costs. Conse-
quently, if one believes that pro￿t maximisation is the ultimate goal of banks then we
would not expect any systematic relationship between capital and pro￿tability. Rather,
the amount of capital that banks choose is endogenously determined within the pro￿t
maximising equilibrium. An important point to note is that this story can only be
true if capital adequacy regulations are non-binding. Of course, if capital adequacy
requirements force banks to hold more capital than what is optimal then we would ex-
pect a negative relationship. Looking at the capital ratios of banks in this sample over
the period in question suggests that banks choose to hold levels of capital well above
what is required by regulatory authorities. Table 2 shows that the average CAR for the
sample of banks over the period of this study was 14.2 percent, well above the nominal 8
percent requirement outlined in the Basel Accord. Moreover, Ngo (2006), Bernauer and
Koubi (2002) and Flannery and Rangan (2004) provide further evidence that capital
requirements are non-binding for U.S. banks.
Now turning to the other explanatory variables, the coe¢ cient on lagged pro￿tability
is positive and statistically signi￿cant at the one percent level of signi￿cance for all eight
regressions. This suggests that pro￿ts of U.S. banks tend to persist some what, which is
supported by the ￿ndings of other studies (for example, Berger et al., 2000) on the U.S.
banking sector. This is in contrast to studies of European banks (for example, Goddard
et al., 2004a & 2004b) that have found the persistence of pro￿t in banking to be weak.
The impact of size on bank pro￿tability appears to be relatively weak. With the ex-
ception of the di⁄erenced GMM regression where ROE is used as the dependent variable,
the coe¢ cient on the size explanator is statistically insigni￿cant for all the regressions
14performed. Similar ￿ndings have been found in recent studies by Athanasoglou et al.
(2005) and Goddard et al. (2004a & 2004b).
The coe¢ cient on the operating expenses variable, OE, is an interesting result. For
all eight regressions, the coe¢ cient on OE is positive and statistically signi￿cant at the
one percent level of signi￿cance. Although this result goes against what one would
expect the impact of higher costs on pro￿tability to be, this paper is not the ￿rst to
￿nd this counter intuitive result (see Bourke, 1989 and Molyneux and Thornton,1992).
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) suggest that this ￿nding could be the result of pro￿ts
being appropriated in the form of payroll expenditures by ￿rms in a regulated industry.
Alternatively, higher expenses could be due to the hiring of higher quality management
which ultimately leads to higher pro￿ts.10
We used the ratio of OBS business to the sum of OBS business and total assets as
our crude measure of diversi￿cation. The pooled least squares IV as well as the GMM
in levels regressions where ROE is the dependent variable produced negative coe¢ cients
signi￿cant at the one percent level. However, all other regressions failed to ￿nd any
systematic relationship between OBS activity and pro￿tability. This evidence is weak
at best - given the insigni￿cant results obtained from most of the GMM regressions - and
the lack of consistency in the results makes it di¢ cult to draw any strong conclusions.
Goddard et al. (2004a & 2004b) ￿nd similar mixed results in their recent work.
As expected, we ￿nd a systematic negative relationship between credit risk and
pro￿tability. An increase in credit risk - or reduction in asset quality - will tend to
lead to greater proportion of non-performing loans and thus reduced pro￿ts. The proxy
used for credit risk was the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans, thus a negative
relationship might also indicate an overly risk averse strategy by management in response
to low quality assets - that is, management may hold more idle capital to provision for
non-performing loans than what is optimal.
Macroeconomic performance appears to be a signi￿cant determinant of bank prof-
itability. All regression results show a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient on CPI, this
is in contrast to the empirical ￿ndings of Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992)
and Athanasoglou et al. (2005) who ￿nd a positive relationship. Whether in￿ ation
a⁄ects pro￿tability positively or negatively depends on whether wages and other non-
interest cost are growing faster than in￿ ation. If in￿ ation is not fully anticipated and
banks cannot appropriately adjust their rates so that their revenues increase faster than
10The regressions were re-run with OE disagregated into interest expenses and non-interest expenses
(e.g. wages, furniture etc.). The results of these regressions were similar to those obtained in the original
estimation and did not provide any further insight so are consequently not reported.
15operating costs, it would be possible that higher in￿ ation leads to lower pro￿ts. As
for GDP, apart from di⁄erenced GMM and ￿xed-e⁄ects estimation with ROA as the
dependent variable where no signi￿cant relationship was found, economic growth seems
to be positively related to pro￿tability. This result is not surprising since one would
expect growth to drive demand and hence pro￿ts.
We ￿nd a strong positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship between concen-
tration, measured by the HHI, and pro￿t. This ￿nding is supported by most of the
previous work, although Berger (1995a) does ￿nd that concentration is usually nega-
tively related to pro￿t once other variables are controlled for and concludes that the
pro￿t-concentration relationship is a spurious one created by correlations with other
variables. This paper makes no attempt at trying to determine which of the SCP or the
ES hypotheses is driving this positive relationship. Finally, there is little evidence of
any systematic impact on pro￿tability of a bank￿ s choice of charter. That is, choosing
a federal charter over a state charter seems to be irrelevant to pro￿tability.
5.2 Capital Ratio Regressions
Although the focus of the paper was the pro￿t equation, we brie￿ y outline the results
from the capital equation. Tables 5A and 5B present the detailed results for the cap-
ital ratio equation. Here, pro￿tability (ROE or ROA) is modelled as an endogenous
variable. The pooled and ￿xed-e⁄ects IV results show a positive and signi￿cant rela-
tionship between pro￿t and the capital ratio. This is not surprising since one would
expect banks to naturally hold some proportion of increased pro￿ts as capital (Berger,
1995b). Notwithstanding this, once more robust techniques are employed no systematic
relationship is found between pro￿tability and CAR.
As expected, the coe¢ cient on lagged CAR is statistically signi￿cant and positive for
all regressions except for the di⁄erenced GMM estimation. The coe¢ cient on STOCK
is negative and signi￿cant for all regressions apart from the di⁄erenced GMM. This
provides us with some weak evidence that instead of increasing capital in a bullish
market, banks will tend to reduce o¢ cial capital levels in response to an increase in
their hidden reserves.
Most of the regressions ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant relationship between size and
the capital ratio. Thus it appears to some extent that as banks get larger they tend to
hold more capital, possibly because it may be cheaper for larger banks to raise capital, all
else equal. Nevertheless, the coe¢ cient on S-SIZE is negative and statistically signi￿cant
for all regressions which could possibly indicate that, although banks will hold more
16capital as they grow, the trend will start to reverse when banks become very large. One
explanation for this may be that under a regulatory system that requires banks to meet
certain capital requirements, an increase in capital is an important prerequisite for the
expansion of a bank￿ s portfolio of risky assets. However, once banks become so large
that they fall into the ￿ too-big-to-fail￿category they may receive regulatory concessions
or at least an implicit guarantee of a bailout when needed which will induce them to
become less prudent and hold less capital relative to their asset base.
Credit risk and OBS activity do not seem to impact on the capital decision. There
is weak evidence of a positive association between in￿ ation and capital, although the
evidence is far from convincing. There is no evidence that growth in GDP in￿ uences
the level of capital, although some authors suggest that capital accumulation may be
procyclical, that is, more likely to occur during boom periods (Bikker and Hu, 2002).
Finally, the coe¢ cient on the charter dummy indicates that whether a bank charters
with the federal or state authority does not impact on their capital decision.
6 Conclusion
This study set out to investigate in detail the relationship between capital and pro￿tabil-
ity in banking. Capital and its adequacy has been at the forefront of the regulatory
debate for decades, yet we seem to be no closer to understanding what impact capi-
tal requirements have on banking performance. Banks are always opposed to stricter
requirements suggesting that holding additional capital is costly and therefore hinders
pro￿tability, yet continue to maintain capital levels well above those o¢ cially required
by the authorities. As with any economic activity, increasing capital comes at a cost
but also provides additional bene￿ts that are fully compensating. Thus given that cap-
ital requirements are not binding, we argue that a bank￿ s capital ratio is endogenously
determined within a pro￿t maximisation process.
The results from the study yield unequivocal evidence for endogeneity of capital
ratio. Contrary to what has been reported with surprising frequency in the past, we
￿nd no systematic relationship between capital and pro￿tability in banking. It follows
that the coe¢ cients of single equation models of bank pro￿tability that included capital
as a determinant are biased.
The ￿ndings support the view that the market succeeds in bringing forth capital
ratios that are approximately appropriate for various banks. These capital ratios di⁄er
across banks because of the di⁄ering circumstances facing banks. Indeed, if these varying
capital ratios were outcomes of perfectly competitive markets, they would eliminate any
17systematic relation between capital and performance. While no claims are made that
the market in which capital structures are formed is perfect, this evidence suggests that
it is not so imperfect as to create a systematic relationship that is left unchanged by
investors who seek to maximise the returns that they earn.
18References
[1] Athanasoglou, P. P., S. N. Brissimis and M. D. Delis (2005), ￿Bank-Speci￿c, In-
dustry Speci￿c and Macroeconomic Determinants of Bank Pro￿tability.￿ Working
Paper No. 25, Bank of Greece.
[2] Akhavein, J. D., A. N. Berger and D. B. Humphrey (1997), ￿The E⁄ects of
Megamergers on E¢ ciency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Pro￿t Function.￿
Review of Industrial Organization 12, 95￿ 139.
[3] Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991), ￿Some Tests of Speci￿cation for Panel Data:
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations.￿ Review of
Economics Studies 58, 277-297.
[4] Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995), ￿Another Look at Instrumental Variable Esti-
mation of Error Component Models.￿ Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-51.
[5] Baltensperger, E. (1980), ￿Alternative Approaches to the Theory of the Banking
Firm.￿ Journal of Monetary Economics 6, 1-37.
[6] Berger, A. N. (1995a), ￿The Pro￿t-Structure Relationship in Banking: Tests of
Market Power and E¢ ciency Structure Hypotheses.￿ Journal of Money, Credit
and Banking 27, 404-431.
[7] Berger, A. N. (1995b), ￿The Relationship between Capital and Earnings in Bank-
ing.￿ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 27, 432-456.
[8] Berger, A. N., S. D. Bonime, D. M. Covitz and D. Hancock (2000), ￿Why are Bank
Pro￿ts so Persistent? The Roles of Product Market Competition, Information
Opacity and Regional Macroeconomic Shocks.￿ Journal of Banking and Finance
24, 1203-1235.
[9] Berger, A. N., G. A. Hanweck and D. B. Humphrey (1987), ￿Competitive Viability
in Banking: Scale, Scope and Product Mix Economies.￿ Journal of Monetary
Economics 20, 501-520.
[10] Berger, A. N., R. J. Herring and G. P. Szego (1995), ￿The Role of Capital in
Financial Institutions.￿Journal of Banking and Finance 19, 257-276.
[11] Bernauer, T. and V. Koubi (2002), ￿Regulating Bank Capital: Can Market Dis-
cipline Facilitate or Replace Capital Adequacy Rules?￿ Center for International
Studies Working Paper No. 3-2002, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology.
19[12] Bikker, J. A. and H. Hu (2002), ￿Cyclical Patterns in Pro￿ts, Provisioning and
Lending of Banks and Procyclicality of the new Basel Capital Requirements.￿ BNL
Quarterly Review, 143-175.
[13] Bourke, P. (1989), ￿Concentration and Other Determinants of Bank Pro￿tability
in Europe, North America and Australia.￿ Journal of Banking and Finance 13,
65-79.
[14] Boyd, J. H. and S. L. Graham (1991), ￿Investigating the Banking Consolidation
Trend.￿ Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 3-15.
[15] Davis, P. E. and H. Zhu (2005), ￿Commercial Property Prices and Bank Perfor-
mance.￿ BIS Working Papers No. 175, Bank for International Settlements.
[16] Dermirguc-Kunt, A. and H. Huizinga (1999), ￿Determinants of Commercial Bank
Interest Margins and Pro￿tability: Some International Evidence.￿ The World Bank
Economic Review 13, 379-408.
[17] Dermirguc-Kunt, A. and H. Huizinga (2000), ￿Financial Structure and Bank Prof-
itability.￿ Mimeo, The World Bank.
[18] Dietrich, J. K. and C. James (1983), ￿Regulation and the Determination of Bank
Capital Changes: A Note.￿ Journal of Finance 38, 1651-1658.
[19] Flannery, M. J. and K. P. Rangan (2004), ￿What Caused the Bank Capital Build-up
of the 1990s?￿ Mimeo, University of Florida.
[20] Furlong, F. T. and M. C. Keeley (1989), ￿Capital Regulation and Bank Risk Taking:
A Note.￿Journal of Banking and Finance 13, 883-891.
[21] Goddard, J., P. Molyneux and J. O. S. Wilson (2004a), ￿The Pro￿tability of Euro-
pean Banks: A Cross-Sectional Dynamic Panel Analysis.￿ The Manchester School
72, 363-381.
[22] Goddard, J., P. Molyneux and J. O. S. Wilson (2004b), ￿Dynamics of Growth and
Pro￿tability in Banking.￿ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 36, 1069-1090.
[23] Hansen, L. (1980), ￿Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments
Estimators.￿ Econometrica 50, 1029-1054.
[24] Hayashi, F. (2000) Econometrics, Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ.
20[25] Kahane, Y. (1977), ￿Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial Intermedi-
aries.￿Journal of Banking and Finance 1, 207-218.
[26] Kaufman, G. G. (1991), ￿Capital in Banking: Past Present and Future.￿Journal
of Financial Services Research 5, 385-402.
[27] Keeley M. C. and F. T. Furlong (1990), ￿A Re-examination of Mean Variance
Analysis of Bank Capital Regulations.￿Journal of Banking and Finance 14, 69-84.
[28] Koehn, M. and A. M. Santomero (1980), ￿Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio
Risk.￿Journal of Finance 35, 1235-1250.
[29] Lam, C. H. and A. H. Chen (1985), ￿Joint E⁄ects of Interest Rate Deregulation
and Capital Requirements on Optimal Bank Portfolio Adjustments.￿ Journal of
Finance 45, 563-575.
[30] Maddala, G. S. and S. Wu (1999), ￿A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with
Panel Data and a Simple New Test.￿ Oxford Bulletin of Econometrics and Statistics
61, 631-652.
[31] Mingo, J. (1975), ￿Regulatory In￿ uence on Bank Capital Investment.￿ Journal of
Finance 30, 1111-1121.
[32] Molyneux, P. and J. Thornton (1992), ￿Determinants of European Bank Pro￿tabil-
ity: A Note.￿ Journal of Banking and Finance 16, 1173-1178.
[33] Ngo, P. T. H. (2006), ￿A Theory of Precautionary Capital in Banking.￿ Mimeo,
Australian National University.
[34] Peltzman, S. (1970), ￿Capital Investment in Commercial Banking and its Relation
to Portfolio Regulation.￿ Journal of Political Economy 78, 1-26.
[35] Pringle, J. J. (1974), ￿The Capital Decision in Commercial Banks.￿ Journal of
Finance 29, 779-795.
[36] Pringle, J. J. (1975), ￿Bank Capital and the Performance of Banks as Financial
Intermediaries: Comment.￿ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 7, 545-550.
[37] Rhoades, S. A. (1982), ￿Structure and Performance Studies in Banking: A Up-
dated Summary and Evaluation.￿ Sta⁄ Studies No. 118, Federal Reserve Board,
Washington DC.
21[38] Short, B. K. (1979), ￿The Relation Between Commercial Bank Pro￿t Rates and
Banking Concentration in Canada, Western Europe, and Japan.￿ Journal of Bank-
ing and Finance 3, 209-219.
[39] Smirlock, M. (1985), ￿Evidence on the (Non) Relationship between Concentration
and Pro￿tability in Banking.￿ Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 17, 69-87.
[40] Sundararajan, V., C. Enoch, A. San JosØ, P. Hilbers, R. Krueger, M. Moretti and
G. Slack (2002), ￿Financial Soundness Indicators: Analytical Aspects and Country
Practices.￿ Occasional Paper 212, International Monetary Fund.
22Table 1 De￿nitions of Variables Used in the Study
De￿nition
Endogenous Variables
ROEit return on equity, de￿ned as the ratio of net pro￿t to total equity [net
pro￿t/total equity].
ROAit return on assets, de￿ned as the ratio of net pro￿t to total assets [net
pro￿t/total assets].
CARit capital assets ratio, de￿ned as the ratio of capital to total risk weighted
assets [(tier 1 capital + tier 2 capital)/total risk weighted assets].
Control Variables
ROEit￿1 ROE lagged one quarter
ROAit￿1 ROA lagged one quarter
CARit￿1 CAR lagged one quarter
SIZEit proxy for size, de￿ned as the natural logarithm of total assets [ln(total
assets)].
S ￿ SIZEit square of the natural logarithm of total assets [{ln(total assets)}2]
OEit ratio of operating expenses to total assets [operating expenses/total
assets].
DIV it proxy for diversi￿cation, de￿ned as the ratio of o⁄-balance-sheet (OBS)
business to the sum of total assets and OBS business [OBS/(OBS +
total assets)].
CRt proxy for credit risk, de￿ned as the ratio of loan loss provisions to total
loans [loan loss provisions/total loans].
GDPt quarterly growth in real gross domestic product
CPIt quarterly growth in consumer price index
HHIt Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index for market concentration
STOCKt Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 (full-cap) index in levels
Charter Dummy variable indicating charter authority, 1 = federal, 0 = state, n.a.
Time Dummies set of 9 dummies, one for each year except 1996
State Dummies set of 53 dummies, one for each state except New York
23Table 2 Summary Statistics
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the study. The notation used
in the following table is de￿ned as follows: ROE is the ratio of net pro￿t to total equity; ROA is the
ratio of net pro￿t to total assets; CAR ratio of capital to total risk weighted assets [(tier 1 capital
+ tier 2 capital)/total risk-weighted assets]; SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets; S-SIZE is
the square of the natural logarithm of total assets; OE is ratio of operating expenses to total assets;
DIV is the ratio of o⁄-balance-sheet (OBS) business to the sum of total assets and OBS business
[OBS/(OBS + total assets)]; CR is ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; GDP is the quarterly
growth in real gross domestic product; CPI is the quarterly growth in consumer price index; HHI is
the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index for market concentration; and STOCK is the Dow Jones Wilshire
5000 (full-cap) index in levels.
Variables Observations Arithmetic Mean Standard Deviation
ROE 62433 0.0706 0.1596
ROA 62433 0.0070 0.0204
CAR 62433 0.1420 0.1669
GDP 62433 3.5095 2.0721
CPI 62433 0.6273 0.5685
STOCK 62433 10031.78 2181.09
HHI 62433 0.0140 0.0044
SIZE 62433 13.4388 1.8358
OE 62433 0.0345 0.1011
DIV 62433 0.0371 0.1548
CR 62433 0.0137 0.3359
24Table 3 Tests of Endogeneity
The table presents the results of tests of endogeneity of CAR in the ROE/ROA equation
(equation 1) as well as the results of tests of endogeneity of ROE/ROA in the CAR
equation (equation 2). The notation used in the following table is de￿ned as follows:
ROE is the ratio of net pro￿t to total equity; ROA is the ratio of net pro￿t to total assets;
CAR ratio of capital to total risk weighted assets [(tier 1 capital + tier 2 capital)/total
risk-weighted assets].
Pooled IV Fixed E⁄ects IV
Pro￿t Equation (H0: CARit is exogenous)
Dependent Variable ROEit ROAit ROEit ROAit
W-H F test 198.85386*** 571.68055*** - -
D-W-H ￿2 test 198.44373*** 566.98143*** - -
D-M F test - - 140.3064*** 398.6949***
Capital-to-Asset Ratio Equation (H0: ROEit/ROAit is exogenous)
Endogenous regressor ROEit ROAit ROEit ROAit
W-H F test 835.59277*** 22.03150*** - -
D-W-H ￿2 test 825.10693*** 22.05062*** - -
D-M F test - - 899.6859*** 21.36332***
Notes: 1) */**/*** indicate test statistic is statistically signi￿cant (reject H0) at the 10/5/1 percent level of sig-
ni￿cance respectively. 2) W-H is Wu-Hausman, D-W-H is Durbin-Wu-Hausman, D-M is Davidson-MacKinnon.
25Table 4A Least Squares Pro￿tability Regressions
The table presents the regression results for the pro￿tability equation (equation 1) using ROE as well as ROA as a mea-
sure of pro￿tability. CAR is modelled endogenously in all regressions and results are included for pooled two-stage-least
squares/instrumental variables (2SLS/IV) and ￿xed-e⁄ects 2SLS/IV model ￿ts. The notation used in the following table
is de￿ned as follows: ROE is the ratio of net pro￿t to total equity; ROA is the ratio of net pro￿t to total assets; CAR
ratio of capital to total risk weighted assets [(tier 1 capital + tier 2 capital)/total risk-weighted assets]; SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets; S-SIZE is the square of the natural logarithm of total assets; OE is ratio of operating expenses to
total assets; DIV is the ratio of o⁄-balance-sheet (OBS) business to the sum of total assets and OBS business [OBS/(OBS +
total assets)]; CR is ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; GDP is the quarterly growth in real gross domestic product;
CPI is the quarterly growth in consumer price index; HHI is the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index for market concentration; and
STOCK is the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 (full-cap) index in levels.
Pooled IV Fixed E⁄ects IV
Dependent Variable ROEit ROAit ROEit ROAit
CARit 0.167332*** 0.0004673*** -0.0044509 0.0045426***
(3.90) (15.13) (-0.54) (5.08)
ROEit￿1 0.1608379*** - 0.0230811*** -
(40.35) - (5.63) -
ROAit￿1 - 0.3007003*** - 0.1993725***
- (70.10) - (43.51)
SIZEit 0.0012539 -0.0001042 -0.0015185 -0.000317
(0.244) (-0.90) (-0.70) (-1.35)
S ￿ SIZEit 0.0001743*** 0.0000109** 0.0000964 0.0000168
(3.56) (2.07) (0.75) (1.21)
OEit 0.363626*** 0.0970049*** 0.4413421*** 0.1121677***
(56.99) (139.79) (61.08) (143.39)
DIV it -0.0405613*** -0.0006533 -0.0033876 0.0003606
(-8.15) (-1.22) (-0.31) (0.31)
CRit -0.0518403*** -0.0073937*** -0.0887422*** -0.0078234***
(-2.79) (-3.71) (-4.49) (-3.64)
GDPt 0.0013299*** 0.0000928** 0.0007048* 0.0000394
(3.26) (2.12) (1.81) (0.93)
CPIt -0.0250927*** -0.0023131*** -0.02221675*** -0.0019684***
(-18.37) (-15.94) (-17.17) (-14.04)
HHIt 13.28217*** 0.7562759*** 12.97762*** 0.6457112***
(18.37) (9.75) (18.77) (8.60)
Charter Dummy 0.0032151** 0.0002758* -0.0049293 -0.0001024
(2.26) (1.80) (-0.73) (-0.14)
Constant -0.1165415*** -0.0057637*** -0.032712 -0.0046088*
(-11.94) (-5.50) (-1.52) (-1.82)
F stat 137.62*** 534.43*** - -
Wald ￿2 stat - - 21401.55*** 40236.32***
R2 0.1431 0.3973 - -
Adjusted R2 0.1420 0.3965 - -
R2 within - - 0.0976 0.3263
R2 between - - 0.0318 0.1678
R2 overall - - 0.0701 0.2479
Notes: 1) */**/*** indicate coe¢ cient (or test statistic) is statistically signi￿cant at the 10/5/1 percent level of signi￿cance
respectively. 2) Figures in the parentheses are t statistics.
26Table 4B GMM Pro￿tability Regressions
The table presents the regression results for the pro￿tability equation (equation 1) using ROE as well as ROA as a measure
of pro￿tability. CAR is modelled endogenously in all regressions and results are included for general methods of moments
(GMM) instrumental variables (IV) and di⁄erenced GMM (dynamic panel estimation) model ￿ts. The notation used in the
following table is de￿ned as follows: ROE is the ratio of net pro￿t to total equity; ROA is the ratio of net pro￿t to total
assets; CAR ratio of capital to total risk weighted assets [(tier 1 capital + tier 2 capital)/total risk-weighted assets]; SIZE is
the natural logarithm of total assets; S-SIZE is the square of the natural logarithm of total assets; OE is ratio of operating
expenses to total assets; DIV is the ratio of o⁄-balance-sheet (OBS) business to the sum of total assets and OBS business
[OBS/(OBS + total assets)]; CR is ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; GDP is the quarterly growth in real gross
domestic product; CPI is the quarterly growth in consumer price index; HHI is the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index for market
concentration; and STOCK is the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 (full-cap) index in levels.
GMM Di⁄erenced GMM
Dependent Variable ROEit ROAit ROEit ROAit
CARit 0.006067 0.005816 -0.817483 0.0826427
(0.30) (1.52) (-1.42) (0.79)
ROEit￿1 0.30047*** - 0.2569367*** -
(3.72) - (2.97) -
ROAit￿1 - 0.3673068*** - 0.2617313***
- (4.22) - (3.51)
SIZEit 0.0007217 -0.0000584 0.1010606*** 0.0000186
(0.87) (-0.38) (3.90) (0.00)
S ￿ SIZEit 0.0001965*** 0.00000828 -0.0073926*** -0.0000423
(4.52) (1.58) (-4.01) (-0.12)
OEit 0.3595672*** 0.0887353*** 0.4327365*** 0.14248***
(3.96) (3.20) (4.49) (4.77)
DIV it -0.0390136*** -0.0006268 0.0268154 0.0039642
(-6.90) (-1.15) (1.06) (0.88)
CRit -0.1561336*** -0.008296** -0.2293659*** -0.0184459***
(-4.35) (-2.04) (-8.38) (-8.85)
GDPt 0.0025464*** 0.0001362** 0.0023046*** 0.0000722
(6.33) (2.52) (3.86) (1.01)
CPIt -0.0259188*** -0.0024591*** -0.0131555*** -0.0010959***
(-10.28) (-7.39) (-6.92) (-4.41)
HHIt 12.41451*** 0.8122025*** 5.321411*** -0.0412907
(21.03) (3.27) (6.61) (-0.29)
Charter Dummy -0.0021414 0.0002616 0.717953 -0.0071856
(-1.53) (1.32) (1.28) (-.071)
Constant -0.109891*** -0.0062032** 0.0130622*** 0.0005903**
(-14.23) (-2.48) (11.15) (2.55)
R2 centered 0.1231 0.3933 -0.2502a 0.1604
R2 uncentered 0.2677 0.4577 -0.2502a 0.1604
Hansen J stat 6.507*** 0.740 43.195*** 0.896
Notes: 1) */**/*** indicate coe¢ cient (or test statistic) is statistically signi￿cant at the 10/5/1 percent level of signi￿cance
respectively. 2) Figures in the parentheses are t statistics. a) We report the R-squared for completeness however it really
has no statistical meaning in the context of IV. For instrumental variables estimation, some of the regressors enter the model
as instruments when the parameters are estimated. However, since our goal is to estimate the structural model, the actual
values, not the instruments for the endogenous right-hand-side variables, are used to determine the model sum of squares
(MSS). The model￿ s residuals are computed over a set of regressors di⁄erent from those used to ￿t the model. This means
a constant-only model of the dependent variable is not nested within the IV model, even though the IV model estimates an
intercept, and the residual sum of squares (RSS) is no longer constrained to be smaller than the total sum of squares (TSS).
When RSS exceeds TSS, the MSS and the R-square will be negative.
27Table 5A Least Squares Capital-to-Asset Ratio Regressions
The table presents the regression results for the capital ratio equation (equation 2). CAR is the dependent variable
and pro￿t (ROE or ROA) is modelled endogenously in all regressions. Results are included for pooled two-stage-least
squares/instrumental variables (2SLS/IV) and ￿xed-e⁄ects 2SLS/IV model ￿ts. The notation used in the following table
is de￿ned as follows: ROE is the ratio of net pro￿t to total equity; ROA is the ratio of net pro￿t to total assets; CAR
ratio of capital to total risk weighted assets [(tier 1 capital + tier 2 capital)/total risk-weighted assets]; SIZE is the natural
logarithm of total assets; S-SIZE is the square of the natural logarithm of total assets; OE is ratio of operating expenses to
total assets; DIV is the ratio of o⁄-balance-sheet (OBS) business to the sum of total assets and OBS business [OBS/(OBS +
total assets)]; CR is ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; GDP is the quarterly growth in real gross domestic product;
CPI is the quarterly growth in consumer price index; HHI is the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index for market concentration; and
STOCK is the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 (full-cap) index in levels.
Pooled IV Fixed E⁄ects IV
Dependent Variable CARit
Endogenous Regressor ROEit ROAit ROEit ROAit
ROEit 0.1472165*** - 0.1814434*** -
(24.23) - (24.07) -
ROAit - 0.7117435*** - 0.7039691***
- (30.47) - (26.58)
CARit￿1 0.9463259*** 0.9385124*** 0.7934596*** 0.7891522***
(479.08) (499.778) (239.2) (262.60)
STOCKt -0.00000189*** -0.00000129*** -0.00000208*** -0.00000119***
(-4.48) (-3.33) (-4.89) (-3.13)
SIZEit 0.0013371*** 0.00157*** 0.0112309*** 0.0108315***
(2.56) (3.25) (10.28) (10.97)
S ￿ SIZEit -0.0001563*** -0.0001305*** -0.0008576*** -0.0008267***
(-6.59) (-5.94) (-13.27) (-14.15)
CRit 0.0456534*** 0.043331*** 0.0013858 -0.0109883
(5.08) (5.20) (0.14) (-1.21)
DIV it 0.0099722*** 0.0034049 0.0095234* 0.0080505
(4.11) (1.52) (1.73) (1.62)
GDPt 0.0002609 0.0003191* 0.0002105 0.0002784
(1.26) (1.66) (1.02) (1.49)
CPIt 0.0059894*** 0.0034019*** 0.0068473*** 0.0029632***
(9.15) (5.90) (10.11) (5.23)
Charter Dummy 0.0008609 0.0007905 0.015653*** 0.0146717***
(1.25) (1.24) (4.59) (4.76)
Constant 0.0181871*** 0.0125039*** 0.005657 0.155417
(4.00) (2.98) (0.47) (1.46)
F stat 3718.93*** 4342.21*** - -
Wald ￿2 stat - - 28892276*** 354487.56***
R2 0.8131 0.8398 - -
Adjusted R2 0.8128 0.8396 - -
R2 within - - 0.4734 0.5708
R2 between - - 0.8028 0.8448
R2 overall - - 0.6597 0.7216
Notes: 1) */**/*** indicate coe¢ cient (or test statistic) is statistically signi￿cant at the 10/5/1 percent level of signi￿cance
respectively. 2) Figures in the parentheses are t statistics.
28Table 5B GMM Capital-to-Asset Ratio Regressions
The table presents the regression results for the capital ratio equation (equation 2). CAR is the dependent variable and
pro￿t (ROE or ROA) is modelled endogenously in all regressions. Results are included for general methods of moments
(GMM) instrumental variables (IV) and di⁄erenced GMM (dynamic panel estimation) model ￿ts. The notation used in the
following table is de￿ned as follows: ROE is the ratio of net pro￿t to total equity; ROA is the ratio of net pro￿t to total
assets; CAR ratio of capital to total risk weighted assets [(tier 1 capital + tier 2 capital)/total risk-weighted assets]; SIZE is
the natural logarithm of total assets; S-SIZE is the square of the natural logarithm of total assets; OE is ratio of operating
expenses to total assets; DIV is the ratio of o⁄-balance-sheet (OBS) business to the sum of total assets and OBS business
[OBS/(OBS + total assets)]; CR is ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans; GDP is the quarterly growth in real gross
domestic product; CPI is the quarterly growth in consumer price index; HHI is the Her￿ndahl-Hirschman Index for market
concentration; and STOCK is the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000 (full-cap) index in levels.
GMM Di⁄erenced GMM
Dependent Variable CARit
Endogenous Regressor ROEit ROAit ROEit ROAit
ROEit 0.0135359 - 0.0351384 -
(0.67) - (0.21) -
ROAit - 0.2454821 - 0.6065652
- (1.35) - (0.56)
CARit￿1 0.9657093*** 0.9595668*** 1.200149 0.1977729
(18.73) (18.90) (0.68) (0.13)
STOCKt -0.00000103** -0.00000115*** -0.00000091 -0.00000044
(-2.34) (-3.16) (-0.72) (-0.44)
SIZEit 0.0015025 0.0015273 0.0448577*** 0.0480063***
(1.10) (1.20) (2.59) (2.59)
S ￿ SIZEit -0.0001188* -0.0001196* -0.0031615*** -0.0033986***
(-1.68) (-1.84) (-3.03) (-2.90)
CRit 0.0373669 0.0383816 -0.0066156 0.0054711
(0.77) (0.83) (-0.31) (0.20)
DIV it 0.0029742 0.0027976 -0.0477104 -0.0435088
(0.90) (0.91) (-0.46) (-0.35)
GDPt 0.0003655* 0.000374** 0.0003529 0.0001188
(1.79) (2.01) (0.80) (0.21)
CPIt 0.0014235 0.0018964** 0.0010032 0.0012205
(1.46) (2.15) (0.42) (0.53)
Charter Dummy 0.001488 0.0012939* 0.0481087 0.0752216
(1.62) (1.79) (1.06) (1.56)
Constant 0.0100408* 0.0106457*** -0.0002572 -0.0002518
(2.37) (2.82) (-0.06) (-0.10)
R2 centered 0.83339 0.8378 -1.1333a -0.033a
R2 uncentered 0.9028 0.9051 -1.1333a -0.0329a
Hansen J stat 2.519 4.039 5.883*** 1.925
Notes: 1) */**/*** indicate coe¢ cient (or test statistic) is statistically signi￿cant at the 10/5/1 percent level of signi￿cance
respectively. 2) Figures in the parentheses are t statistics. a) We report the R-squared for completeness however it really
has no statistical meaning in the context of IV. For instrumental variables estimation, some of the regressors enter the model
as instruments when the parameters are estimated. However, since our goal is to estimate the structural model, the actual
values, not the instruments for the endogenous right-hand-side variables, are used to determine the model sum of squares
(MSS). The model￿ s residuals are computed over a set of regressors di⁄erent from those used to ￿t the model. This means
a constant-only model of the dependent variable is not nested within the IV model, even though the IV model estimates an
intercept, and the residual sum of squares (RSS) is no longer constrained to be smaller than the total sum of squares (TSS).
When RSS exceeds TSS, the MSS and the R-square will be negative.
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